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 The Timing of Marriage in the Transition to
 Adulthood: Continuity and Change,
 1860-19751
 John Modell
 University of Minnesota and Philadelphia Social History Project
 Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., and Douglas Strong
 University of Pennsylvania
 INTRODUCTION
 All societies are age graded to a degree and must, therefore, make some
 provision for marking and sanctioning the orderly passage from one stage
 of life to the next. The patterning of social transitions provides an unusually
 good site from which to observe regularities of a social system over time.
 Clearly, the ways in which such transitions are accomplished are not fixed
 features of any given society but are subject to renegotiation as social and
 economic conditions change. In turn, the alteration of social schedules may
 itself be a source of change, bringing about shifts in other social institutions.
 Such alterations, though sometimes subtle, are a prime subject for inquiry.
 Remarkably little attention in the literature on family history has been
 given to the subject of transitions. Most family scholars, attempting to
 depict change over time, have fixed their interest on shifts in household
 size, composition, and headship (Hareven 1976). In this excessive preoccupa-
 tion with the organization of the household, more dynamic processes have
 been slighted; it is almost as though it were necessary to make the family
 stand still in order to appreciate that it has changed.
 Both on an aggregate and an individual level, it is easy to treat events
 1 The present essay develops ideas first explored by the senior authors (with Theodore
 Hershberg) in "Social Change and Life Course Development in Historical Perspective"
 (1976). In turn, the latter piece was in good measure a response to questions raised by work
 on the life course by Elder, esp. in his Children of the Great Depression (1974). Furstenberg
 (1975) and Modell (1975) have each published review essays of the Elder book. Elder
 (with Richard Rockwell) also addressed the question of marital age in a paper delivered
 at the 1975 annual meetings of the ASA. Research for the present essay was carried out at
 the Philadelphia Social History Project, University of Pennsylvania, with the financial
 support of the Center for the Study of Metropolitan Problems, National Institute of
 Mental Health (grant MH 16621). We thank Theodore Hershberg, director of the Phila?
 delphia Social History Project, for his colleagueship and scholarly involvement during the
 writing of this paper. We wish also to thank, for thoughtful readings, George Alter,
 Saundra-Lynn Coulter, Glen Elder, Jr., Sara Evans, Claudia Golden, William Wilcher,
 our colleagues at the Russell Sage-AJS conference, and two anonymous readers for the
 Journal.
 ? 1978 by The University of Chicago. 0002-9602/79/8407-0O04$02.63
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 such as marriage, birth, death, or any important status transition as if they
 occurred in isolation. Status transitions only take on meaning, however,
 when they are placed in a social context, as significant moments in "the
 persistent organic interdependency of the cohort-specific life history"
 (Ryder 1965, p. 290). The approach we adopt begins by observing regulari-
 ties in the timing of human events, and ultimately seeks to account for the
 sequencing of these events in the life span.2 Thus, for example, to make sense
 of conjugal timing?as we shall try to do in this paper?we must examine
 the distribution of conjugal careers of age peers. Earliness or lateness of
 marriage are terms that acquire meaning only when individuals are examined
 in the context of a particular cohort, or when one cohort is seen in the light
 of the experience of other cohorts.
 There is another sense in which the examination of conjugal timing must
 be viewed in a social context. The timing of marriage can best be understood
 when it is related to other status transitions which typically follow or
 closely precede the entrance to matrimony. A shift in marriage age is a
 relatively trivial finding unless this change is seen in the context of the
 timing of other events in the familial career such as entrance to the labor
 force, establishment of a household, or first birth. Rather than looking at
 marriage age as a separate demographic or psychological phenomenon, we
 view it as one feature in the allocation of roles to members of a cohort and
 in the construction of the life course of the constituents of this cohort
 (Riley, Johnson, and Foner 1972).
 Placing the question of marital timing in a life-course perspective is
 easier to do in theory than in practice. The historical data, and even the
 contemporary data on nuptial age, do not readily fit the type of analysis we
 are advocating. We are on fairly firm ground in our analyses of the distribu?
 tion or variation of marriage age over time, but when we take up the rela?
 tionship of marriage to other life events the data do not always carry us as
 far as we might like. Our ideal end?to establish changes in the social con?
 struction of familial "careers" among the members of successive cohorts?
 can only be approached by stretching the historical data to (and perhaps in
 some instances beyond) its limits. Experience is longitudinal, but both
 population lists and event lists are rarely in longitudinal form. Our contrived
 life-course analysis suggests where true longitudinal work might profitably
 begin, for the meaning of "timing" is visible only when conceived as part of
 a career and these careers as characteristic experiences of cohorts.
 This temporal or life-course perspective, we believe, offers distinct
 advantages to social historians. First, by observing how individuals re-
 2 We detect a similar strain emerging as well in the area of stratification studies. Haller and
 Portes (1973, pp. 53 and 55), e.g., note that research in this field has turned from single-
 attribute "mobility scores" to the study of "the process of stratification" and that therefore
 "a theory of status attainment . . . must . . . take into account possible changes occurring
 in the structure of status systems."
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 sponded to particular constraints and options at critical junctures in their
 life courses, we have some basis for assessing their preferences and predilec-
 tions. In so doing, we may gain some sense of how individuals actively
 responded to changing opportunities. Second, shifts in the construction of
 the life course themselves become an impetus for institutional change. As
 alterations occur in the sequence or timing of life events, other features of
 society must often be modified accordingly. The timing of marriage, to cite
 the example we shall explore in this paper, is not merely a reflection of
 institutional change but a source of change, instigating economic and social
 innovations (e.g., the provision of married-student housing by universities).
 Our principal objective in this paper is to illustrate the value of examining
 historical data from this perspective. Our analysis follows a stepwise pro?
 cedure, building out from simple constructs (the transition to marriage) to
 more complex ones (family formation). Substantively, we shall attempt to
 show that a significant transformation has taken place in the process of
 family formation over the past century. The data with which we establish
 these trends will not permit us to explain with any degree of precision why
 changes occurred when they did, but the coincidence of events will suggest
 some possible interpretations.
 Our analysis divides into two parts. The first, a descriptive section depict-
 ing nuptial trends over the past century, will present data not new to
 scholars in the field, although sometimes we have organized this material
 in novel ways. In the second part of the paper, we will show how the changes
 in nuptial timing which occurred in this century reoriented the whole process
 of family formation. This discussion will lead us to some plausible ways of
 interpreting the emergence of the more contemporary pattern of family
 formation, interpretations we hazard at the conclusion of our essay.
 Patterns of Marriage Timing
 Though marriage age has long been a topic of speculation in the literature
 of family sociologists, few scholars took the trouble to assemble quantitative
 materials from earlier times before Monahan's pioneering though somewhat
 chaotic study of the subject in 1951. Monahan took previous observers to
 task for their tendency to treat marriage age as a simple function of indus?
 trialization and urbanization. Drawing upon the existing data at the time
 which could be extracted from federal, state, and local censuses, and from
 state and local vital registration systems, he came to the conclusion that
 age at marriage in the early United States was essentially the same as
 in 1890, when U.S. census data on marital status began to permit closer
 scrutiny.3 Glick (1957) and his collaborators (Carter and Glick 1970) and,
 3 The evidence that Monahan uses is quite varied and subject to a variety of biases. We
 have subjected one of the more substantial sets of these data to a more refined analysis
 than Monahan was able to perform. A close examination of the Michigan and New York
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 independently, Jacobson (1959) have generally buttressed Monahan's
 interpretation of the historical record. The work of these scholars indicates
 that neither rapid nor sustained long-term changes in median age at marriage
 occurred until the 1940s.
 Table 1 abstracts the marriage experience of U.S. birth cohorts dating
 to the mid-19th century, drawing from successive census reports. Table 2
 presents similar information from single-year periods of first marriages in
 Massachusetts over roughly the same period. The cohort reports (if we
 TABLE 1
 Median, First and Ninth Deciles, Spread of First Marriage, and
 Estimated Proportion Ever Married for Cohorts Born
 1865-1874 to 1925-1934, United States
 Sources.?Marital status by sex and age data from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1913, 1922, 1933a, 19436,
 1953a, 1964a, 1972).
 * Includes extrapolations into future.
 state censuses for 1854-55 and 1874-75 strongly indicates that the urban/rural and east/
 west variations in age at marriage (derived from proportions married in age-standardized
 populations) existed in the 1850s as in the 1870s and, as can be systematically observed, in
 the 1890 federal census. But there are no trends whatever in these years, except what is
 owing to an occasional tendency in Michigan toward more even sex distributions and thus
 more effective marriage markets. The period of early industrialization, thus, saw none of
 the shift in marriage patterns that had been inferred from literary sources. There are
 suggestions?again confirming Monahan?that this finding of basic stability can be
 pushed back even further to 1825, based on the analysis of age-standardized proportions
 of women married in three decennial New York state censuses, 1825 through 1845 (see
 References for details of census sources). We do not preclude the possibility of cyclical
 variations during the 19th century similar to those described by Katz elsewhere in this
 volume, but the available data seem to show no secular trend during the early phase of
 industrialization in the United States.
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 assume a closed population) may be viewed as a rough proxy for longitudi?
 nal data. The period data on marriages, on the other hand, depict all the
 first-marriage events taking place in a single year. As such, they are subject
 to considerable variation from year to year as the population of marriers
 changes in size and composition.4 Despite the very different basis of the two
 TABLE 2
 Median, First and Ninth Deciles, and Spread of
 First Marriage, Selected Years
 1867-1971, Massachusetts
 Sources.?First marriages by age from Massachusetts, Vital Statistics (various
 years).
 * Cannot be calculated since 10th percentile falls in lowest tabulated age group.
 4 The reader should be aware that an effective national marriage registration system was
 not created in this country until the 1950s and even then published less rich data than did
 some of the states and localities. Massachusetts developed the first adequate state registra?
 tion system, for all vital events, in the United States and was one of the few states to
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 tables, the gross cohort patterns evidently outweigh annual variation, and
 the two tables yield approximately the same picture?a remarkable stability
 in age at marriage during all but the most recent part of the past century.
 The post-World War II drop in marriage age reveals a magnitude of change
 which the slow and measured decline prior to 1920 in no way approaches.
 Finer calculations probably would show some amount of fluctuation of
 the median, but the overall pattern of long-term stability is hard to dismiss.
 This pattern is especially noteworthy in view of the enormous social and
 economic transformation that occurred in the late-19th and early-20th
 centuries. Massive immigration, westward population movement, and both
 urban and industrial growth left surprisingly little trace on the age at mar?
 riage of both males and females during this period. Rather than long-term
 developments in the economy or composition of the population gradually
 bringing age of marriage down, it was the widely publicized marriage boom
 of the 1940s that did so, at an unprecedented rate.
 Not only did the period after World War II mark an abrupt decline in
 marriage age, but it signified another important departure in the timing of
 marriage. Although in theory the ages at which members of a birth cohort
 marry could scatter in an infinite number of ways, in fact the distribution
 assumes a probabilistic form. The shape of this marriage curve is determined
 by at least two independent parameters, namely, the initial age at which
 transition to marriage commences for the cohort and the proportion of those
 who ever wed (Coale 1971; Hernes 1972).5
 When one examines marriage spread?the amount of time it takes a
 cohort to achieve its maximal proportion ever married?it is clear that an
 important change has taken place since the 19th century.6 Eliminating the
 provide first-marriage data for the 19th century. For these reasons, we, like others using
 state statistical materials for historical inquiry, rely heavily upon Massachusetts even
 while recognizing its atypicality in degree of industrialization and in some demographic
 features. Period data which are weaker both conceptually and in coverage are introduced
 for a very particular reason. We wish to show that the changes in marriage patterns which
 we describe were neither peculiar to a single region nor merely a function of a complicated
 population redistribution. We also wish to establish that the timing of the changes is so
 striking that the points of inflection can be seen in records of marriage events as well as
 in the marital statuses of individuals. We are looking for trends, not exact measures of
 levels; and the two data sources ought on the whole to agree, their testimonies to reinforce
 one another. In the case of age at marriage, the Massachusetts data are also supported by
 various data from New York, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Michigan, all cited by
 Monahan, and by materials from Philadelphia which we were able to examine in con?
 siderable detail.
 6 Coale (1971) assumes the independent "setting" of minimum marriage age, and age for
 completion of the marriage process, for a given cohort. Hernes's (1972) alternative model
 for the nuptial process would express our observation as an increase in the initial marriage-
 ability, offset by an increase in the deterioration of marriageability with age.
 6 The measure is described more fully elsewhere (Modell et al. 1976). In essence, we are
 applying techniques of interpolation from grouped data, that might be used for computing
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 two extreme tails?the youngest 10% to marry and the oldest?in the 19th
 century, it took 15 or more years for 80% of the men who ever wed to marry
 and roughly 12 or 13 years for the same proportion of women to enter
 wedlock. Recent data show that there is now much less variation in the age
 at marriage. The central 80% of the 1925-34 birth cohort of male ever-
 marriers managed the transition in 8.6 years, and the females did so even
 more rapidly. Table 3 shows the proportion of all marriages which are
 achieved in the top three modal years of age for the marriage of successive
 cohorts. These figures provide further corroboration for the conclusion that
 modality in marriage timing has markedly increased for both men and
 women, though the changes among the males are again more dramatic
 (Ryder 1969).
 The data presented in tables 1,2, and 3 not only establish that modality
 has increased over time but they also help to pinpoint when this change took
 place. Marriage age did not become more narrowly bounded until after the
 Second World War, despite the gradual lowering of the median age before
 1920. But there was a sharp reduction in the spread of marriage for both
 sexes in the late 1940s. This trend, of course, corresponded to the conspicuous
 drop in marriage age which we noted earlier. Up to that point, there had
 been a remarkable degree of constancy in marriage spread during the previous
 half century. Although it is difficult to bring the figures up to the recent
 TABLE 3
 Proportion of all Marriages Contracted through Age 34 Attributable
 to Three Most Marriage-Prone Years of Age for Single-Year
 Birth Cohorts 1885-1935, United States
 % Marriages?through Age 34,
 Encompassed in Three Top Years Top Three Years of Marriage
 Y ar o -
 Birth Male Female Male Female
 1885. 24.1 28.4 22,24,25 19,20,21
 1890. 27.3 27.6 22,23,24 19,20,21
 1895. 28.2 27.4 22,23,25 18,19,20
 1900. 27.6 30.9 21,22,23 19,20,21
 1905. 28.1 30.3 22,23,24 18,19,20
 1910. 25.7 29.1 23,24,25 18,19,20
 1915. 28.5 28.9 22,23,25 19,20,21
 1920. 21.6 32.5 21,22,23 20,21,22
 1925. 38.4 34.2 21,22,23 18,21,22
 1930. 33.7 37.6 20,21,22 18,19,20
 1935. 35.7 38.8 20,21,22 18,19,20
 Sources.?Retrospective data on age at first marriage by sex and single year of age from U.S. Bureau of
 the Census (1966, 1973ft).
 a median, to compute the point of the first and ninth deciles. The number "ever married"
 is taken to be the highest proportion ever married listed for any age group. Glick (1957;
 and Carter and Glick 1970) has on several occasions used the interquartile range of age at
 marriage as a spread measure but has made little of it.
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 present because more recent cohorts have not yet completed their marriage
 transition, there is no reason to believe that the change after World War II
 was short-lived. Both recent registration figures from Massachusetts and
 estimates of nuptial timing based on Current Population Surveys suggest
 that the high degree of modality continues, slightly modified, even though
 marriage age has started to climb. Apparently, the marriage spread for
 females has increased somewhat during the past decade (though it is still
 far below its prewar level). For males, marriage spread has remained quite
 stable (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975).
 When we look more closely at the figures presented in table 2, the compo?
 nents of the trend toward modality are immediately apparent. After the
 war, little change occurred in the age at which the first tenth of the age
 cohort married, but a vast amount of change took place in the behavior
 of the later deciles. Generally, the "late" marriers entered matrimony
 much earlier than had been the case in previous eras. Except for a few
 stragglers, the market virtually closed down for women after their mid-
 twenties, and for men by their late twenties. There was a rapid disap-
 pearance of eligible bachelors in their thirties, and spinsterhood, the point
 when women are at an age disadvantage in the marriage market, appears
 to have come earlier in recent times. The distribution by age and sex of the
 single and the currently married populations shows dramatically the virtual
 disappearance of a once-significant part of the population?the single adult.
 At the same time, the age structure of the married population has shown
 remarkable stability, owing to the offsetting effects of marriage age and
 mortality.
 Initially, the "marriage rush" which began in the early 1940s affected
 single people of all ages in much the same way. Marriage probabilities for
 very young men and women increased especially markedly in the early
 postwar period as compared with 1940. But even for those who did not
 marry young, the probabilities of marriage at a later age increased.7 The first
 phase of the marriage rush, then, reduced the spread partly by giving a
 special boost to young marriers and partly by simply increasing the propor?
 tion marrying at all ages including the young. This had the effect, in view of
 their already relatively high marriage probabilities, of removing eligibles
 from the marriage market at an earlier point in the life span. At the same
 time, however, there was no backing away from marriage by the depleted
 single remnants of the older cohorts.
 By the end of the 1950s, a new pattern emerged: while the annual proba?
 bilities of marriage for both sexes were still rising, the marriage market
 7 These statements are based on the probability-of-marriage tables (with decrement for
 death) for 1940 and 1948 compiled by Jacobson (1959). The 1940 table shows a general
 increase in marriage probabilities over GrabilPs (1945) table representing the experience
 of the 1920s and 1930s rather than a shift in the age schedule of probabilities.
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 soured for older singles?men and women in their mid-twenties and older?
 even though proportions remaining single throughout the reproductive span
 declined.8 The postwar pattern of more modal marriage, initially a function
 largely of generally heightened probabilities of marriage, was now reinforced
 by a new age-specific marriage schedule. Older marriage probabilities became
 somewhat depressed, absolutely, even as younger singles increased their
 marriage probabilities. Viewed from a life-course perspective, marriage is
 always something of a segregation process: those who by a particular age
 fail to marry find their subsequent chances of ever marrying narrowing
 each year. Between the postwar rush and the end of the 1950s, this selective
 process became even more pronounced.
 Along with the greater degree of uniformity in the marriage timing of
 individuals came a greater degree of coordination of marriage age between
 couples. This more or less follows from what we have seen above. As the
 spread narrowed for both men and women, it might be expected that age
 difference among couples would drop. Unfortunately, extensive historical
 data on single-year age-at-marriage differences among couples do not exist.
 Some fragmentary data reported by Monahan do support the assumption
 that age homophily in marriage rose in the 20th century. Massachusetts
 data, presented in table 4, show some movement in the average relationship
 TABLE 4
 Means and Standard Deviations of the Ages of
 Brides of First-Time Grooms Marrying at Ages
 20-24 AND 25-29, MASSACHUSETTS, 1871-1963
 8 Cf. Jacobson's 1948 table to the one for 1958-60 constructed by Saveland and Glick
 (1969). Differences in compiling procedure do not affect our generalizations. Retrospective
 sample data, from a later survey of economic opportunity, which are somewhat unreliable,
 seem to suggest that in the early 1960s there was a collapsing toward modality at both
 the young and old ends of the marriage period (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1970).
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 between the groom's age at first marriage and that of the bride. But the
 clearest trend is once again seen after World War II, when grooms in the
 modal age category (20-24) seemingly selected younger brides and with
 declining frequency chose brides in older age categories, upsetting what had
 been a rather stable 19th-century pattern. At this point, too, began a steady
 decline in the standard deviation of the ages of brides who married this
 modal set of grooms. The process to matrimony now linked mates more
 nearly similar in age, and did so more uniformly. The increasingly narrow
 range of brides' ages was, one suspects, a reflection of the changing social
 settings in which mates were being discovered (school being the most obvious
 of these).9 At the same time as a shift was taking place in the site of the
 marriage market, the market itself was becoming more homogeneously
 age graded.
 Thus far, we have located several important dimensions of nuptial timing
 and have observed their change over time. Most of the remainder of the
 essay will be devoted to investigating the marriage transition in the context
 of other alterations that were taking place in the whole sequence of family
 formation. Examining the more complex sequence of family formation will
 help to elucidate the social meaning of changes we have already observed
 and may offer certain insights into how and why changes in the nuptial
 patterns came about.
 Structural Contexts of Marriage
 The argument that will unfold in the following sections is briefly that there
 has been a relaxation of constraints upon the ability to marry that allowed
 the timing of marriage to become increasingly preferential. People have
 become relatively more free to marry according to preference because
 structural conditions impose fewer obstacles to matrimony than was once
 the case. What we have termed "structural" conditions range from the
 largely extrafamilial and impersonal forces of a marriage market to the
 very private and personal decisions such as the practice of birth control.
 Under the rubric of "structural" conditions we include, too, changes in
 the economic situation of young adults. There is no question that the ex-
 traordinary productivity of the United States is connected in some way to its
 marriage patterns, which by comparison to countries in Western Europe
 have always been highly youthful. But the commonsense idea that nuptial
 timing responded directly to an increasingly productive economy is mistaken.
 The historical record belies any simple translation of gains in productivity
 9 RockwelPs examination (1976) of educational homogamy indicates that for nonwhites
 the strongest tendency away from "random mating" (with respect to educational attain-
 ment) occurred shortly after World War II, but that for whites it was a prewar product,
 after which it declined slightly, before eventually stabilizing. This trend is over and above
 whatever increased age grading was occurring in educational institutions.
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 into more youthful or uniform marriage. Thus, productivity gains in the
 late-19th century, and the bursts of rapid improvement in disposable income
 per capita (Long 1960; U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 1973), scarcely
 budged marriage timing. At the beginning of the 20th century, age at mar?
 riage declined during two decades of considerable economic growth and then
 leveled off. But these trends correspond poorly to the inflexible patterns of
 marriage modality. The war quinquennium was, of course, one of spectacular
 economic advancement; but it was followed by five years of real decline in
 disposable income. Only after 1950 or so did the improvement in disposable
 incomes per capita again increase. Our contemporary timing patterns were
 established during a period of relative stagnation in the immediate postwar
 period but have declined relatively little during two decades of rapidly
 expanding personal resources.
 The Marriage Market
 Material conditions are not the only structural constraints to contracting
 marriage at the moment one chooses. One needs to find a suitable mate, and
 opportunities for courtship vary according to social setting. A way of
 visualizing these settings is as a marriage market. The demographic charac?
 teristics of the participants in the market, the cultural rules prescribing the
 range of suitable matches, and the geographical extensiveness of the market
 pool together affect patterns of nuptiality. Many individuals, when marriage
 markets were not very orderly, may have married late because they were
 unable to find expeditiously a mate they considered suitable (Groves and
 Ogburn [1928] provide an early empirical examination of marriage markets
 in the United States). We will only adumbrate here the complex process by
 which marriage markets became more efficient, confining ourselves to the
 changing demographic balance in marriage markets. We suspect, however,
 that in other ways, too (ethnic intermarriage is an example), market in-
 efficiencies have declined over time.
 Table 5 presents indicators of the pace of marriage for a sample of 37
 nonsouthern states. (We have excluded those states with heavy concentra-
 tions of rural blacks so as not to complicate our task of identifying ineffi-
 ciencies in the marriage market.) In this table we selectively highlight
 primary marriage ages, citing the proportion of males married at 20-24 and
 25-29 years and of females married at 20-24 years. The table displays the
 data (means and standard deviations for each age group) for 1890, 1920,
 1940, and 1970. The year 1890 is the earliest point when data on marital
 status became available on a national level and is also the beginning of the
 slow secular decline in age at marriage; 1920 marks the period when this
 gradual decline abates; and 1940 marks the last prewar census date. Finally,
 1970 brings the story reasonably near to the present. The figures, the reader
 S130
This content downloaded from 165.123.108.74 on Wed, 07 Jun 2017 19:34:59 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 The Timing of Marriage
 should recall, are means based on state figures. They do not assign different
 weights according to the total population of the 37 states but, rather, treat
 the states themselves as units.
 In our analysis we employ an age-specific sex ratio for the peak marriage
 ages (males 25-29/females 20-24) as a crude indicator of local marriage-
 market variations. Surely, various refinements could be made in this measure,
 but it has the virtue of simplicity, and our objective here is merely to identify
 significant trends.10 For each sex, the ratio reveals local bulges in the popula?
 tion owing to domestic and international migration and, thus, the basis for
 local variation in sex ratio.
 Table 6 presents for dates between 1890 and 1970 the Pearsonian correla?
 tion coefficients between the proportions of ever-married males 25-29 and
 females 20-24, and between both of these proxies for the pace of nuptiality
 and the age-specific sex ratio. In 1890, the sex ratio was strongly correlated
 with the marriage probabilities of both men and young women: in states
 where men dominated the ratio, women were more prone to young marriage
 and the men were less prone. Although other local causes undoubtedly
 promoted positive correlations between the marriage proneness of the two
 sexes, these were outweighed in 1890 by marriage-market imbalances, and
 the correlation between male and female proportions married was signifi?
 cantly negative. By 1920, this correlation had become weakly positive. The
 effect of sex-ratio variation upon marriage had diminished for both sexes,
 and other local conditions affecting marriage now prevailed. By 1940, this
 covariation was highly significant, and male marriage age was no longer
 correlated with the sex ratio, although the female marriage age still was. In
 attenuated form, this pattern persisted to 1970.
 Over time, the structural consideration of sex imbalances in local marriage
 markets ceased to be a factor in the "decision" of when to marry. We may
 well ask whether the disappearance of this once-potent factor was owing to
 a general homogenization in state sex ratios.11 There is, in fact, an unmistak-
 able decline in the variance of the sex ratios (both in the 37 states as well
 as in large U.S. cities). The standard deviation of the state sex ratios was
 0.538 in 1890. It was more than halved to 0.155 by 1920, halved again by
 1940 to 0.073, and was a mere 0.047 in 1970. A regression analysis indicates
 10 Existing census materials would permit the computation of nonmarried sex ratios
 separately for native white, foreign-born white, and black populations (to reflect the
 segregation of marriage markets), with attention to urban/rural market segregation.
 Such refinements are perhaps premature before research on changes over time in the
 operation of marriage markets.
 11 To make sure that the pattern of observed state-to-state relationships was not entirely
 a function of small states with unusual population and marriage configurations, we exam?
 ined the numbers of people in states lying beyond the 1 SD point for sex ratio and pro?
 portions married. Indeed, the 1890 outliers on the high-sex-ratio, low-male-marriage side
 were generally sparsely populated Western states. But from 1920, the extreme states
 took in large populations, who were affected by variations in the workings of the marriage
 market.
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 The Timing of Marriage
 that, up to 1940, this decline alone can explain the diminishing impact that
 sex-ratio imbalances had on age at marriage. However, more recently, in
 1970, what little local variation remained in sex ratios no longer produced
 the effect on marriage age that would have been evident even a generation
 ago.
 The basis for "decision" about marriage timing has changed, then, from
 involuntary to preferential, from a structurally constrained to an individually
 determined basis. Yet, the rationalization of the marriage market?at least
 as we have measured it here?had not led before World War II to a contrac-
 tion of marriage spread. If, as literary evidence would lead us to expect,
 most people wished to marry in their early and middle twenties,12 why did
 not modality increase when marriage markets seemingly permitted more
 uniformity? We have only some possibilities to offer. One is suggested by the
 pattern of annual variation in nuptiality over the past century. Cycles were
 more placid in the late 19th century than in the early 20th, even before the
 extreme swings of the Great Depression (U.S. Department of Health,
 Education, and Welfare 1971, pp. 2-3). Postponements of marriage may
 have become more common in the early-20th century when economic
 prospects were favorable, resulting in a greater marriage spread. Alterna-
 tively, the "new immigration,, may have imposed a greater degree of market
 segregation than had previously existed.
 Changes in the Relationship of Marriage and Headship
 As the traditional marriage-market effects on marriage age declined, other
 determinants replaced them. Part of the evolution toward this new pattern
 in the postwar period involved an altered relationship between the timing
 of marriage and other related transitions. The new basis for nuptial timing
 is part of a general reorganization in the sequence of family formation which
 begins with the relationship between marriage and household headship.
 If we assume, as a casual examination of contemporary data might
 suggest, that the marriage transition implies a simultaneous transition into
 independent household status, we will miss an important element of histori?
 cal change in family formation. While it is true that the greatest part of
 the timing of headship can be explained, at least in a statistical sense, by
 marriage, the two transitions are conceptually distinct. The extent to which
 there has been a pause between the two transitions has varied considerably
 over time. Though today they are usually accomplished simultaneously,
 even now a brief pause often separates marriage from headship.
 12 This statement is based on an examination of late-19th-century popular fiction, news-
 paper writing, marriage manuals, and sermons, carried out by seminar students in 1975.
 None of these sources suggested that marriage ought to be deferred beyond the mid-
 twenties for women or beyond the late-twenties for men.
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 Table 7, reporting headship status over time, displays census data for
 1890 through 1970. The figures reveal a gradual movement toward house?
 hold formation at younger ages. Household headship became more nearly
 universal for the 35-44-year-old males, markedly more common for those
 at the most common marriage ages between 25 and 34, and not so rare as
 once for the young men between 15 (or 14) and 24. In the most general
 terms, this pattern resembles the trend toward younger marriage.13
 The two transitions were, however, far from perfectly related. In fact, age
 at marriage declined considerably more sharply than did age at headship,
 which seemingly was less flexible. (It may well be that in discussing headship
 we are also in an indirect way talking about the provision of housing, and
 housing is dependent on a wide variety of supply factors quite apart from
 demand.) By juxtaposing the headship and marriage rates we can derive
 an estimate, shown in table 8, of the minimum proportion of married men
 at given ages who were not yet household heads. The actual proportion was
 TABLE 7
 % Males Household Heads, by Age, United States, 1890-1970
 Age 1890 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970
 14(15)-24*. 9.0 11.4 10.6 14.7 16.3 16.2
 25-34. 57.8 62.4 62.2 69.4 76.5 77.7
 25-29. 49.4 N.A. 54.2 63.2 N.A. N.A.
 30-34. 67.2 N.A. 70.7 75.9 N.A. N.A.
 35-44. 77.8 80.3 79.5 81.2 85.8 86.4
 Sources.?For 1890 and 1930, age distributions by sex (U.S. Census Office 1895, and U.S. Bureau of the
 Census 1933a) and age distributions of male household heads (U.S. Census Office 1896, and U.S. Bureau of the
 Census 1933c). For 1940 and later years, household status by sex and age data (U.S. Bureau of the Census
 19436, 1953a, 1964a, 1973a).
 * 14-24 from 1950.
 TABLE 8
 Minimum Percentage* of Currently Married Men Not
 Household Heads, United States, 1890-1970
 Age 1890 1930 1940f 1950 1960 1970
 14 (15)-24t. 5.0 20.9 24.2
 25-34. 6.0 8.8 10.7
 25-29. 6.2 ... 13.6
 30-34. 5.8 ... 8.3
 35-44. 3.9 1.5 3.6
 Sources.?Same as tables 1 and 7.
 * Assuming that there are no unmarried household heads.
 f Married and spouse present.
 t 14-24 from 1950.
 13 A discussion of patterns for females here would be redundant insofar as it relates to our
 main argument, and considerably complicated owing to the tendency of widows to live in
 sub- or secondary families within households headed by others.
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 somewhat higher.14 If anything, temporary coresidence of married children
 with parents?the extended household?was more likely in the first half of
 the 20th century than at the end of the 19th. Much of the pattern in 1950,
 of course, can be explained by the housing shortage which persisted until
 well after the end of the war. But this does not explain its persistence in
 1930 and 1940. As late as 1950, many young men were knowingly marrying
 into extended family situations, however temporary.
 Because table 8 shows minima only, we present in table 9 the figures we
 can derive for the actual proportion of married men who were not household
 heads. As the estimates have led us to expect, the 19th-century pattern of a
 looser timing relationship between marriage and headship persists halfway
 into the current century. In more recent years, a far more precise sequencing
 predominates. The postwar pattern, to be sure, reflects previous preferences
 which often had to be held in abeyance for lack of resources. The 1940
 census materials (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1943e, p. 33) show convincingly
 that among the segment of young marrieds the poor and unemployed most
 often failed to establish an independent residence.15 Even today, some young
 people who might wish to marry and establish an independent household
 still cannot afford to do so. The point is that now far more than in previous
 times the two transitions are supposed to be timed together.
 Since at least 1940, then, marriage not closely followed by headship
 attainment was generally a product of an insufnciency of resources on the
 part of newlyweds. This led us to suspect that the increasing coordination of
 TABLE 9
 Percentage of Married Men Who Are Household Heads,
 Philadelphia, 1880, and United States, 1940-1970
 1880
 Age (Phila.) 1940* 1950 1960 1970
 14(15)-24f. Too few N.A. 71.4 79.6 83.3
 25-34. 82.9 83.9 86.3 92.7 94.5
 35-44. 91.2 89.4 91.4 95.1 96.3
 Sources.?1880 Philadelphia col. derived from computerized sample of individuals, enumerated by house?
 hold, from enumerators' manuscripts of 1880 U.S. Census, at Philadelphia Social History Project, University of
 Pennsylvania; 1940 and later years from data on marital status by household status, age, and sex, in U.S.
 Bureau of the Census (1943a, 1953a, 1964a, 1973a).
 * Spouse present.
 t 14-24 from 1950.
 14 In 1950, e.g., where the estimated minimum nonhead married proportion was 12.4%
 at 25-34, the measured proportion was 13.7%. This is because a number of men headed
 households without yet being married; but this number was traditionally small. Even
 today, when such practices are more common, relatively few single males are household
 heads.
 15 Data for Philadelphia and intercity comparisons in 1890 suggest that, on the other
 hand, in the 19th century, where parents could afford it and where houses were large
 enough, temporary coresidence after marriage was seemingly preferred by many younger
 couples, at least while childless.
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 marriage and headship in the postwar period might be explained by a rapid
 diffusion of resources to younger segments of the population. Ideally, to
 test this explanation, we would want to examine the earning capacity of
 young couples over time, but income data are not available for various age,
 marital, and household-status combinations. Labor-force participation,
 however, can serve as a proxy for earning capacity. Our expectation was
 not borne out. Labor-force participation of married household heads was
 nearly universal before 1940 even among the extremely young. If anything,
 the economic position of young married males has become less independent
 in recent decades.
 Further evidence pertaining to this hypothesis is presented in table 10,
 which provides figures on the headship status of young married males who
 were and who were not in the labor force. These data allow us to determine
 whether the greater degree of simultaneity between marriage and household
 headship was occasioned by a closer coordination between marriage and
 entrance to the labor force. The table clearly shows that the tie between
 marriage and labor-force participation has become less crucial than was once
 the case. Regardless of their employment status, most married men today
 are more likely to be household heads. The waning tie between labor-force
 entry and the transition to marriage and household headship obviously
 cannot be explained by a diminished need for resources. Wherewithal
 surely is still required to afford an independent household. But young couples
 have been able to find resources elsewhere?often no doubt from wife's
 earnings but sometimes, too, from parental loans or contributions. The
 increasingly modal timing of marriage and the growing expectation of a
 prompt sequencing of marriage and headship required other flexibilities.
 In order to achieve these ends, couples have been prepared to innovate,
 sometimes in ways formerly unavailable or unacceptable.
 Thus, new patterns were created, and older ones disappeared. Temporary
 coresidence of married couples with parents, long a source of flexibility,
 TABLE 10
 Percentage of Married-Spouse-Present Men Who Are Household
 Heads, by Age and Labor-Force Status, United States, 1940-1970
 Married Men in Labor Force Married Men Not in Labor Force
 1940 1950 1960 1970 1940 1950 1960 1970
 14-17. 50.3 45.7 63.4 ... 15.8 12.3 26.7
 16-19. 82.3 . 72.8
 18-24. 75.5 79.1 90.6 ... 42.3 66.4 77.5
 20-24. 94.6 . 88.0
 25-34. 95.0 90.9 97.3 98.6 64.3 78.3 91.5 94.8
 Source.?Marital status by labor-force status, age, and sex in U.S. Bureau of the Census (1943?, 19536,
 1963, 1973d).
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 became less frequent. Once a strategy for easing the economic demands of
 marriage, family extension became a mildly deviant arrangement.16 Table 11
 provides an estimate of the prevalence of "doubling up" (newlyweds who
 lived with their families for a time after marriage) over time. The percentages
 shown are of the currently married who are living with their own parents
 (both spouse present and spouse absent), subdivided into age groups. (We
 can assume that the figures here should be roughly doubled if our criterion
 for family extension was residence with either set of parents.) The pattern
 is clear. At each point in time a relatively high proportion of the youngest
 married men live with their parents. Coresidence was actually more common
 in 1947 than in Philadelphia in 1880. Yet by late-19th-century standards,
 coresidence was high in Philadelphia because single-family housing was
 plentiful in the city. Only after 1947 did the prevalence of family extension
 decline, and it declined abruptly.17
 Extension, at least insofar as it has affected newlyweds, has not been a
 historical constant. Whether or not we wish to regard the decline of the
 practice of "doubling up" as a significant departure in the history of Ameri?
 can kinship, we cannot completely ignore its implications for family life.
 Even if coresidence was experienced only briefly by most people, it commonly
 affected newlyweds at a critical juncture in their lives and at a time in which
 significant patterns of interaction were being formed. As we have seen,
 19th-century levels of extension persisted into the very recent past; and, as
 with the timing of marriage, World War II marks a dividing line between an
 earlier form of behavior and the one that many have come to believe has
 long been with us.18
 16 In this respect as in many others, black families now resemble 19th-century families in
 their form and strategies. In 1970, regardless of the age of their heads, about three times
 the proportion of black families as of white were extended. The stigma now attached to
 this accommodation has a nice irony, considering how common it was in the white popula?
 tion only a generation ago (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1973c, pp. 237-38).
 17 We have three sets of data bearing upon the question of independent residence for young
 couples, which include information on interval since marriage. These data are from
 Philadelphia in 1880, which we will assume to stand well enough for 19th-century urban
 behavior (probably on the high side of coresidence with parents); from a Current Popula?
 tion Survey taken in April 1948 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1948) near the height of the
 postwar marriage boom; and from the decennial census of 1970. Each shows a sharp
 gradient toward independent residence as length of marriage increases. In 1948 when the
 housing squeeze was intense, no fewer than one-third of all who married within the year,
 of whatever age, were not yet household heads. In 1970 as in 1880, the proportions were
 lower, but even for 1970 the proportions without their own households among those who
 had recently married was high enough to allow us a rough guess that one in five or so
 contemporary grooms live for a while outside of their own households, most typically in
 extended families. The estimate we might derive from 1880 was that about one-third
 experienced extension at some time. Viewed longitudinally, headship attainment is con?
 siderably more complex a process than it would seem from cross-section alone.
 18 Once again we owe an intellectual debt to Monahan, who in a brief note (1956) recog-
 nized but made little of this historical fact.
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 Marriage and Parenthood
 The life-course transition marked by the birth of one's first child is closely
 connected with the transitions into marriage and into independent household
 status. In the timing of fertility, as in the timing of headship, added resources
 ?in this instance contraceptive technology?have potentially permitted a
 wider range of timing choices. In the past, conception and marriage typically
 TABLE 11
 Percentage of Married People Living in Own Parents' Households,
 by Age, Sex, and Presence of Spouse, Philadelphia,
 1880, and United States, 1947-1970
 1880
 (Phila.)
 1947
 (Civilian
 Population)  1970
 All
 Males:
 14-17. N.A.
 18-24. N.A.
 25-34. N.A.
 35-44. N.A.
 Females:
 14-17. N.A.
 18-24. N.A.
 25-34. N.A.
 35-44. N.A.
 Males:
 14-17. N.A.
 18-24. N.A.
 25-34. N.A.
 35-44. N.A.
 Females:
 14-17. N.A.
 18-24. N.A.
 25-34. N.A.
 35-44. N.A.
 Living with Spouse
 Living Apart from Spouse
 Sources.?1880 Philadelphia, same source as table 9; 1947 and subsequent years marital status by household
 status, age, and sex, in U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey, no. 10; and same as table 9.
 Note.?Insufficient cases are denoted by-.
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 were linked closely, with either one of these events closely following the other.
 The rarer of the two sequences, beginning with premarital pregnancy, no
 doubt influences the timing of marriage, though it is not easy to calculate
 the precise effects of premarital conceptions on nuptial timing. Premarital
 sexual activity seems to have sharply increased after the Second World
 War, contributing to far larger numbers of "forced" marriages (Smith
 1973). The decision to marry was for quite a substantial number of marriers
 preempted by earlier and less considered choice. The abrupt postwar
 departure from past patterns of marriage timing thus included an element
 of increased individual control over sexuality.
 In the more common sequence, in which marriage precedes conception,
 anticipated childbirth is a less direct but no less important determinant of
 marriage timing. The expectation of prompt childbirth undoubtedly in?
 fluenced the decision of when to marry. As long as the interval between
 marriage and first birth was more or less fixed, there had to be greater
 flexibility in the staging of transitions related to marriage. (We have already
 seen how the integration of marriage and headship was eased early in the
 20th century in order to "purchase" a slightly lower age at marriage.) The
 20th-century emergence of flexibility in the period between marriage and
 first birth drastically altered the trade-offs customarily made in the process
 of family formation. In this respect, at least, the increasing availability of
 contraception bears analogy to the more efficient operation of the marriage
 market and the rapid expansion of available housing, both of which served
 to remove preexisting structural constraints on the marriage decision, thus
 making nuptial timing more responsive to individual preference.
 Evidence to this effect is presented in table 12, which shows the very
 large changes that occurred in the percentage of all women, 20-24 or 25-29
 and married less than three years, who had given birth to at least one child.
 The age groups vary together closely and change a great deal from date to
 TABLE 12
 Percentage of Women, by Age, Bearing First Child within Three
 Years of Marriage, 1910-1970, and within One and
 Two Years of Marriage, 1950-1970, United States
 Age at Census 20-24 Age at Census 25-29
 Married (Years) Married (Years)
 Census 1-2 2-3 3 or Less 1-2 2-3 3 or Less
 1910. N.A. N.A. 53.3 N.A. N.A. 45.9
 1940. N.A. N.A. 37.7 N.A. N.A. 32.0
 1950. 39.1 59.5 41.3 36.7 54.4 40.8
 1960. 61.8 79.9 56.1 55.5 71.0 54.2
 1970. 30.7 53.8 36.7 31.0 47.1 37.0
 Source.?Retrospective reports on fertility from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1947, 19556, 1964c, 1973/).
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 date. In 1910, more than half the wives 20-24 years old married less than
 three years (i.e., with an average marriage duration of 18 months) had borne
 a child. The likelihood, then, was for relatively rapid childbirth. The change
 between 1910 and 1940 was a large one, probably indicating a more wide?
 spread knowledge of contraception as well as a hesitant climate for child?
 bearing in the uncertain economic setting of the depression. These factors
 outweighed likely gains in fecundability. It seems at least possible, then,
 that part of the prewar 20th-century decline in marriage age was due to an
 increased independence of the timing of marriage from the timing of the
 first birth.19
 Between 1940 and 1960, a rapid shortening of the interval between mar?
 riage and first birth took place, approaching the patterns set in 1910. Only
 a part of this shift can be accounted for by the rising rates of premarital
 pregnancy. Changing preferences seem to have dictated the rest. Given the
 choice, most young married couples once again virtually merged the two
 transitions. The equally rapid shift between 1960 and 1970 back toward
 the 1940 pattern shows that this aspect of the larger change was a relatively
 temporary phenomenon. As preferences increasingly prevail in the timing of
 family building, rapid fluctuation becomes more possible and, we suspect,
 more likely.
 The postwar period brought a sharp decline in the median age of first
 birth due in part to a much reduced marriage age for women but also, as
 we have seen, to a greater proclivity for a closer articulation between
 marriage and childbearing. The transformation that occurred in the age of
 females at the birth of their child, and its relationship to changes in marriage
 age, is shown in table 13. The increase in age at first birth between 1928 and
 1948, along with the concurrent slow decline in marriage age, reflects the
 TABLE 13
 Median, First and Ninth Deciles, and Spread of Age
 of Mother at First Childbirth, Selected Years
 1917-1970, United States Registration Area
 Median First Ninth
 Age Decile Decile Spread
 1917*. 22.8 17.1 29.7 12.6
 1928. 21.9 17.8 29.4 11.6
 1938. 22.4 18.0 29.9 11.9
 1948. 22.5 18.1 30.4 12.3
 1954. 22.0 17.8 29.9 12.1
 1960. 21.1 17.5 28.2 10.7
 1970. 21.3 17.4 27.1 9.7
 Sources.?Age of mother at first childbirth data from U.S. Department of Health,
 Education, and Welfare, Vital Statistics of the United States (various dates).
 * Based, unlike the other years, on five-year age categories.
 19 We would of course prefer to compare fertility experience around 1890 to that in 1920
 in order to establish this point. Regrettably, these data are not available in aggregate form.
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 greater conscious delay of the first birth.20 In addition, the modality of age
 at first birth had greatly increased by 1960. The transition to parenthood
 was becoming increasingly age graded, just as was marriage. (Interestingly
 enough, the tendency toward increasing uniformity remained strong at least
 through 1970, despite the decline in the birth rate during this period, which
 might well have resulted in a widening of the spread in the age at first birth.)
 The postwar movement toward greater modality in the period between
 marriage and first birth has two components. The first, as we have seen, is a
 movement toward a more standard interval between marriage and first
 birth. But a second and equally important development is the growing trend
 for late and early marriers to behave similarly. Before 1940, age at marriage
 was significantly related to the length of the interval between marriage and
 childbirth. As is shown in table 13, in 1910 young marriers were prompter
 childbearers than those who deferred marriage. The pattern disappeared by
 1970.21 Predictably enough, this change took place between 1940 and 1950.
 A more extensive view of the same phenomenon is shown in table 14. The
 numbers represent the difference between those 20-24 and 25-29 in per?
 centage of those still childless, at given marriage durations. Generally, the
 differences dwindle after the war, following increases between 1910 and 1940.
 Viewed from this perspective, we see that the general hesitation about
 committing oneself to childbirth that obtained in 1940 did no thing to erase
 the strong relationship that had been present, at least in 1910, between age
 at marriage and first childbirth. Indeed, this association was strengthened
 TABLE 14
 Difference in Percentages Child?
 less between Married Women
 25-29 AND 20-24 AFTER 0-4 AND
 5-9 Years of Marriage, United
 States, 1910-1970
 Married (Years)
 0-4 5-9
 1910. 4.8 6.7
 1940. 5.8 10.2
 1950. -3.0 4.5
 1960. -2.5 4.0
 1970. -3.5 .6
 Sources.?Same as table 12.
 20 The 1917 figure perhaps belies this observation. The data upon which the figure is based,
 however, may be faulty in that they alone are tabulated by five-year age groups. The only
 19th-century data that we know to exist concerning age of mother at first birth are from
 Michigan in 1884 and 1894. These are published in one-year age groups and show spread
 figures closer to 1928 than to 1917.
 21 We omit the youngest mothers from consideration here because so many in this category
 have had premarital conceptions.
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 by comparison with 1910. Prior to World War II, it would seem, the timing
 of marriage set the terms of other familial events. Age at marriage was an
 important career contingency, affecting the pace of the transition to parent-
 hood. But, after the war, marriage age ceased to have a continuing effect on
 the timing of parenthood. As never before, the matrimonial decision, itself,
 now subsumed one's past.
 Marriage and Female Labor-Force Participation
 The slight decline in marriage age in the first half of the 20th century can be
 seen as partially facilitated by two transformations: the continuing accept-
 ability of coresidence with kin, and the ability and desire to delay child?
 bearing after marriage. To some extent, certain components of the transition
 to adulthood (independent residence, the rapid movement to childbearing)
 were for a time subordinated to young marriage. Though initially a housing
 shortage inhibited the establishment of uniform sequence of family formation
 in the postwar period, soon a rapid expansion of the housing stock and the
 continuation of a delay between marriage and first birth allowed most to
 follow the trend toward more uniform marriage ages.
 At least one more feature of the life course was modified, as table 15 shows,
 TABLE 15
 Percentage of Married Women in Labor Force by Age and
 Childbearing Status, United States, 1890-1970
 Age of Woman
 14-19 20-24 25-29 30-34
 1890:*
 All:. 2.2 (at 15-24) ... 2.5 2.4
 1920:*
 All. 12.5 (at 15-19) 11.4 9.7 (at 25-34)
 1940:f
 Nonmothers. N.A. 27.3 (at 18-24) 35.9 31.2
 Mothers. N.A. 6.4 (at 18-24) 8.7 8.8
 1950:1
 Women with no child
 under 10. 31.3 (at 15-19) 54.2 53.8 49.0
 Women with children
 under 10. 10.4 13.9 15.3 18.2
 1960:1
 Nonmothers. 37.3 63.5 66.3 72.4
 Mothers. 26.2 34.0 34.2 39.2
 1970:t
 Nonmothers. 43.5 71.1 72.4 66.7
 Mothers. 26.2 34.0 34.2 39.2
 Sources.?U.S. Bureau of Census (1907, 1923, 1943d, 19556, 1963, 1973d).
 * Native whites of native parentage; "breadwinner" definition of labor-force participation.
 f All married women with husbands present.
 X All married women.
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 in the process of achieving a younger marriage age?that of married female
 participation in the labor force. One striking feature of the table is the con?
 stant but decreasing difference in labor-force participation between wives
 with and without children. But more important as a determinant of marriage
 age is the (re)invention, since 1890, of the working wife. Like the growing
 gap between marriage and first birth, the possibility of employment for
 married women increased the flexibility of timing choice for young people
 who were contemplating matrimony. Once again, the decade in which the
 transformation is most evident is the crucial World War II decade. For
 20-24-year-old women, the age group in which the marriage surge was
 concentrated, an enormous increase occurred in labor-force participation,
 an increase which has not subsided even to date.
 Conclusion
 Seen from a life-course perspective, we have argued that important features
 of the 19th-century pattern of family formation in the United States lasted
 at least until World War II. Despite such widely recognized changes in
 family-related behavior as the gain in income per capita, the completion of
 the demographic transition, the steady extension of school careers, and the
 emergence of a postparental period, young men and women typically left
 their parents' homes, married, and set up their families over very nearly the
 same parts of their lives in 1940 as they had for the previous half-century.
 During the war and in the postwar period, the timing of marriage and its
 relationship to other transitions altered markedly. Once in place, the postwar
 pattern itself was surprisingly persistent, though we are forever catching
 distant early warnings of its cracking: widespread premarital cohabitation,
 increased single parenthood among the young, a new valuation for "child-
 less" marriage, and a return to more complex household forms. We offer no
 prognostications but wish to reiterate that we have observed, using varied
 and sufficiently reliable sources of data, that abrupt change followed a
 relatively lengthy period of stasis. It could well happen again.
 We have located a significant historical transformation in the American
 family but have not provided a satisfactory explanation for the changes
 which have been depicted. To do so would require a detailed chronology of
 the wartime and postwar transition in marriage age, with attention to local
 variations. With due appreciation for the complexities of providing this sort
 of account, we shall conclude by sketching some of the considerations that
 may have figured in the transformation. Our interpretation takes into
 consideration both changing structural conditions and alterations in prefer?
 ences in the postwar period, events which may have helped to dislodge the
 pattern of family formation carried over from the previous century.
 The Great Depression was severe enough and long enough that, unlike
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 previous cyclicalities, the age structure of marriage was altered. Careers
 were not merely temporarily delayed but were reoriented.22 Beginning with
 the cepression and continuing for a decade or more, both marriage and child?
 bearing generally became problematic. Perhaps half a generation of youth
 thus were cut loose from traditional timing criteria, long enough for the
 criteria themselves to shift.23 As early as 1940, established patterns of family
 formation were breaking down as young people anticipated the outbreak
 of war and the economic crest that so typically accompanies armament.
 Marriage became what one commentator called "the war disease." The
 reasons for this are various: some calculatively economic, some unabashedly
 romantic, some involving the innovation of new patterns while pursuing the
 logic of existing norms. "If we wait until the men come back after this war
 lasts several years, they'11 pass us up for younger women," reasoned one
 Ohio respondent to a question about war marriages. "You can depend on
 it," said another. "Men just go for widows, grass or sod, better than a
 chilly virgin."24
 Toward the end of the war, a certain degree of uneasiness was reflected in
 the family literature as to whether servicemen might have lost the necessary
 "domestic skills" to maintain stability in the family. The enormous surge of
 marriages in the early postwar period provided reassurance that men had
 not lost their taste for matrimony. While there was an active campaign for
 marriage education in the schools, the church, the home, and the office of
 the marriage counselor, marriages contracted at ages that once would have
 seemed too young were rarely condemned in the postwar period. Experts
 expressed confidence, however, that the marriage rush was a temporary
 phenomenon. They were wrong.25
 We do not believe that wartime experience as such permanently changed
 marriage preferences and thereby marriage practices, though it must be
 regarded as at least a logical possibility. A more theoretically compelling
 explanation would detail underlying structural alterations. The present
 22 Bernard's (1940) perceptive treatment of the effect of the depression on age at marriage
 seems to assume that the kind of change she found in the 1930s?a postponement specifi?
 cally of younger marriages?was typical in cyclical movements. Our close examination of
 Massachusetts, Michigan, and Philadelphia marriage-registration data convinces us of
 the exact opposite: in altering the age schedule of marriage, the depression was unique
 among American fluctuations.
 23 As Waring (1975) indicates, one of the social responses to imbalance between roles and
 available candidates is "changing the age criteria" for these roles.
 24 Throughout the war, the popular literature and writings of family-study professionals
 was preoccupied with the question of the desirability of war marriages, the number of
 which soared, though generally sympathies ran high for the young couple who wished to
 gain some measure of "personal security as the sea of crisis runs high" (Panunzio 1943;
 Robbins 1944).
 25 In 1946, Glick characterized the rush as a " 'borrowing' of marriages from the future"
 (p. 240), while Davis (1950) soon thereafter anticipated a low marriage rate in the 1950s,
 despite favorable economic prospects, "because a large portion of the' marriageable popula?
 tion has been, so to speak, used up in the matrimonial marathon of the 1940's" (p. 10).
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 paper cannot pretend to isolate these, but it seems likely that some combina-
 tion of three dimensions are at the heart of the changing pattern of family
 formation: shifts in the degree of age grading, rearrangements in the family
 economy examined over the family life cycle, and new institutional bases
 for life-course decisions.
 Age grading in American society has tightened significantly in two
 respects, both of which imply closer coordination in the timing of behaviors
 (like marriage) among age peers. Despite the expansion of higher education
 and the lengthening of educational careers, school departure has nonetheless
 become more modal. Between 1940 and 1950 more young people stayed in
 school until high school graduation and seem to have done so at a rather
 more uniform age, even though the educational attainment generally became
 more varied within successive cohorts during this same period (Rockwell
 1976). Thus, the percentage of males, 18-20 years of age, who had ceased
 their education after four years of high school was 27.5% in 1940 and 32.3%
 in 1950.26 Moreover, for young men, the wartime and peacetime conscription
 (or at least the possibility of it) was a powerful agency for creating cohort
 self-consciousness.27 (The peacetime draft, of course, is over; the constraints
 that structure lives continue to change.)
 The 19th-century family economy, as we have noted, typically took a
 cooperative form at various stages in the family life cycle. From one point
 of view, this was no less true after World War II than before?despite the
 proliferation of new families. The proportion of urban families with two or
 more members in the labor force remained around 32% in 1930 and 1940,
 rose to 34.5% in 1950, and then to 43.8% in 1960 and 52.1% in 1970 (U.S.
 Bureau of the Census 1943g, p. 36; 1955a, pp. 2A-31; 19646, pp. 5-9; 1973e,
 p. 13). A 1947 Current Population Survey inquiry into the subject showed
 virtually identical distributions of husband-wife families by numbers in the
 labor force in 1947 as in 1940 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1946-1947, no.
 10, pp. 6-7).
 Yet looked at more closely, a shift was taking place within this continuing
 26 From level of education by age data and cross-sectional enrollment-by-age data (see
 U.S. Bureau of the Census 1943c, 1953c).
 27 The conjunction of the draft, school-departure timing, and the timing of marriage is
 treated in a thought-provoking way by Winsborough (1975, 1976) in a series of unpublished
 papers based on recent longitudinal and retrospective data. Winsborough speculatively
 emphasizes the effects of the draft on the higher male marriage modality and greater
 youthfulness in the postwar period, and argues that cohort-by-cohort variation in this
 period can be explained by the effects of cohort variation in military service, working
 through age-specific probabilities of marriage in and out of the service. This, Winsborough
 suggests, can have operated virtually independently of any changes in preference. Indeed,
 Winsborough's model fits the postwar period rather neatly, despite its exclusive focus on
 male experience. We doubt, though, that it could alone explain the sharp transformation
 which took place in the decade of the forties. Indeed, the age-specific marriage patterns
 Winsborough's model presupposes are postwar, and are themselves products of the melo-
 drama and underlying structural changes we are discussing.
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 facade of economic collaboration. We suspect that this change reflected and
 in part contributed to the demarcation of generational units. Specifically,
 married women participated in the labor force, as it were, in place of children,
 who now stayed in school longer, or left their families of orientation to
 establish their own households. Comparing young adult participants in the
 labor force in 1940 and 1950, we find two dramatic shifts. The number of
 single male relatives of heads 18-24 (typically sons) who worked was about
 halved in the decade, while the number of young working wives more than
 doubled. The increase of working wives, as we have seen, was directly
 associated with earlier establishment of household headship.
 These patterns are quite complex, and no descriptive account?certainly
 not one so sketchy as ours?can untangle the labor-market and family-
 economy considerations that went into the marked reordering of priorities
 reflected in these figures. The critical conclusion, however, seems unmistak-
 able: a changing and again vibrant economy made available the jobs that
 permitted a novel integration of work and family roles, a manifestation of
 which was the postwar age-at-marriage pattern.28
 A final aspect of family economy is far harder to get at but has the ad?
 vantage of leading us toward institutional changes. The prewar collaborative
 family depended, especially in times of distress, on the economic contribu?
 tions of adult offspring, who typically remained in the home. Under postwar
 conditions, however, when prosperity made young people residentially
 independent at an earlier age, the direction of economic dependency may
 have reversed (on net, that is, for exchanges in both directions still exist and
 no doubt always have) (Hill 1970). A charming piece of historical ethnog-
 raphy, we suspect, would be to recreate the development (in the postwar
 period, probably) of the variety of ritual falsehoods by which parents
 subsidized the marriages of their children, who would have been both too
 young and too dependent to marry by the standards of an earlier generation.
 The overall effect of institutional change in the war decade, apparently,
 was to redistribute benefits in an age-specific manner, with the consequence
 of promoting earlier and more modal marriage patterns. The most obvious
 of such institutional innovations were the G.I. Bill of Rights and Social
 Security. The redistributions affected by both of these governmental
 innovations increased decision-making flexibility and thus had an impact
 28 Moreover, we suspect that not only were the performers of work roles changing in a way
 that altered the pattern of family formation, but also the jobs available to young people
 influenced the transition from the family of orientation to the family of procreation. The
 occupations which provide stable, predictable careers appeared to increase over the 1940s
 and in many cases to be available to new entrants to the labor force. This age group also
 seems to have improved their average annual earnings at an especially lively pace over the
 period, and these earnings improvements may well have been invested in the establishment
 of independent households. Again, these observations are tentative and call for far more
 intensive analysis, fortunately of data that exist in profusion (U.S. Bureau of the Census,
 Current Population Survey, P-60, annually; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1943/).
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 analogous to that of contraception or female employment. Each seemingly
 removed barriers to marriage. The G.I. Bill essentially allowed veterans to
 pass rapidly through a number of transitions which previously would have
 required an extended period,29 while the Social Security System hastened
 the movement away from the 19th-century collaborative family economy by
 freeing young people, at least in part, from the burden of caring for their
 elderly kin.30
 From the perspective of the individual, the postwar period appeared to
 pose fewer impediments to arranging the life course ad lib.31 As individuals
 gained the resources to schedule decisions according to their own personal
 timetables, they did so more uniformly than before. From the vantage point
 of any cohort, at least after the immediate postwar period, life-course
 choices became more modal. We do not wish to insist, however, that the
 new timing of marriage inevitably bound the individual into a more determi-
 nate conjugal career than was the case in previous times. A more prescribed
 course of family formation did not preclude subsequent flexibility in the
 familial career. Perhaps, as Ryder (1969, p. 116) suggests with regard to
 fertility, the new modality of family formation will increasingly bind cohort
 histories to "questions of fluctuation rather than of trend."
 In this paper we have kept narrowly to first entrance to the married state,
 ignoring divorce. We suspect that our discussions of modality and timing
 would have been considerably different, reversed perhaps, if our concern
 were not first but final marriage. And, lest our argument create another
 29 The original bill provided one year of schooling for veterans who had served 90 days and
 who were not older than 25 at time of entry. In addition, it provided one year of schooling
 for every year of service up to a maximum of four subsidized years. The bill provided for
 payment of fees, tuition, books, and supplies, and carried a monthly subsistence payment
 of $50 for single veterans and $75 for married veterans. Both payments were soon increased.
 Home, farm, and business mortgages were easily and generously financed under the G.I.
 Bill. Fully $14.5 billion was transferred to veterans under the various titles of the G.I. Bill,
 affecting more than 7.5 million veterans (Olson 1974).
 30 The influence of the Social Security System on the timing of marriage can best be seen
 as part of a larger long-term shift that led to greater economic independence of older people
 from those younger. Changes in intergenerational transfers are hard to document, but
 beginning in about 1950 older people began to receive increasing sums from extrafamilial
 sources. Expressed in constant 1966 dollars, average income for a married couple on
 Social Security rose from $1,720 in 1941-42, to $1,930 in 1951, to $2,900 in 1962. At the
 same time, beneficiaries who had adult children in their households declined from 34% in
 1941-42 to 17% in 1957, and the proportion of recipients who also received financial
 assistance from relatives and friends dropped from 11% to 3%. Private pension plans, in
 general, affected increasing numbers after 1950. Both public and private plans, though
 benefits were not widely distributed, were "in place" at war's end (Merriam and Skolnick
 1968).
 31 We are struck by the convergence of our argument with Turner's (1976) recent contribu?
 tion to historical social psychology, partly because we seem to recognize different parts of
 the same phenomenon coming from radically divergent perspectives. Turner suggests
 that the last 20 or 30 years has probably seen an increase in our society of individuals who
 recognize their "real selves" as being anchored not in institutional requirements but in
 individual impulse.
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 unattainable "world we have lost," just beyond our memories, of individuals
 who lacked our current burden of timing marriage correctly, let us recall
 that such changes are rarely irreversible.32 What we have observed, after all,
 may well be but a fluctuation.
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